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 Introduction 
Realizing la fuerça de imaginar 
 
 
 
One of the greatest stories never told, in any compelling way, is the history 
of the imagination, and its relationship to reality. Wallace Stevens’ 
‘necessary angel’, briefly glimpsed, hovering on the threshold of the ‘real’ 
world it shapes, is just one envisioning of a concept that has spawned 
unexpected, and even ‘untimely’, artistic permutations.1  There is no smooth 
narrative through Foucauldian-inspired epochal shifts; certainly none that 
allow us to remain attentive to imagination’s polysemantic possibilities.2 For 
it is the very nature of the imagination to elude demarcation of boundaries 
(its own and those we would draw around it), and to slip the too rigid 
moorings of historico-ontological designations and epistemological domains. 
As the imagination has demonstrated in its myriad cultural productions 
throughout the ages, it ‘maketh matter’ in ways that can defy the linear 
machinations that have privileged ‘Modernity’,3 and deconstruct (if not 
dissipate) the dominant narratives suggested by weighted use of a 
                                                          
 1 The interplay between the imagination and reality (construed in terms of the 
connections between consciousness and the world) was an obsessive concern of the American 
poet Wallace Stevens.  The verse, ‘I am the necessary angel of the earth, / Since, in my sight, 
you see the world again’, was included by Stevens as an epigraph on the flyleaf of his volume, 
The Necessary Angel: Essays on Reality and the Imagination by Wallace Stevens (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).  The lines are taken from the poem ‘Angel Surrounded by Paysans’, 
from the anthology The Auroras of Autumn (1950) in which the imagination conjures up a 
personification of reality as an angel whose introduction to one of the countrymen opens: ‘I am 
the angel of reality, / Seen for the moment standing in the door’ (see Wallace Stevens, Collected 
Poetry and Prose [New York: Library of America, 1966], 638). 
 2 The philosopher Richard Kearney’s study The Wake of Imagination: Towards a 
Postmodern Culture (New York: Routledge, 1988) is a case in point. Kearney’s study 
investigates the imagination as moving through three paradigms in the history of the Western 
intellectual tradition. Notwithstanding his own caveats around the ‘flexible hermeneutic’ 
applied (‘heuristic guideline rather than historicist dogma’), and his insistence on history as 
‘an open-ended drama of narratives’ (The Wake of Imagination, 19–20), it is his paradigmatic 
organization that has prevailed and been adapted by subsequent readers.  
 3 The quotation is taken from Sir Philip Sidney’s The Defence of Poesy and concludes a 
section in which he extolls the best poet as the one who follows ‘the course of his own 
invention’.  Imagination makes the poet: ‘where all other arts retain themselves within their 
own subject and receive, as it were, their being from it, the poet only bringeth his own stuff, 
and doth not learn a conceit out of matter, but maketh matter for a conceit’ (see The Defence 
of Poesy, in Sir Philip Sidney, The Major Works, ed., with an intro. & notes, by Katherine 
Duncan-Jones (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 2002), 213–50 (pp. 218 and 232). 
hierarchically-inflected prefix.4 As Matthew Maguire has reminded us, 
assumptions that have governed the imagination’s relationship to meaning, 
to value and to order, are themselves just ‘the product of a history’.5  To a 
large extent we too are ‘products’ of the great historical ‘movements’ that 
inform and fire our own imaginations: notably humanism, romanticism, 
modernism and, more recently, postmodernism.6 Enculturated in the latter, 
we now enjoy sufficient critical distance to assimilate any ‘losses’ sustained.7  
We are, therefore, well positioned to appreciate that the radical 
permissiveness that characterized postmodernism’s engagement with power 
structures, and with their contingent discourses, constituted not so much a 
break with the past, but a re-evaluation of its own germinating seeds; and 
also to recognize our own ironic complicity in the prioritizing of privileged 
viewpoints (for we are constructed in, out of, or ‘other’ to, these very 
privileges).  Through this contemporary lens, the possible worlds created by 
the poetic or ‘fictive imagination’, to use Timothy Reiss’ term,8 appear even 
more vitally metaphorical, and more difficult to reconcile with imagination’s 
‘official’ genealogy:  a system within which the mimetic pre-modern cedes to 
the productive early modern, which becomes in its turn the exalted modern, 
before collapsing into postmodern’s paradigmatic parody.  
The essays in this volume offer a corrective to attempts to chart a history 
of the imagination as a progressive flow through a chronological series of 
philosophical tracts and treatises (generally evidenced in carefully chosen, 
illustrative textual case studies).9 Rather, the contributions included here 
                                                          
 4 Kearney refers to the risks of viewing the imagination as an ‘ineluctably developing 
essence rising to its golden maturity in the modern era and declining rapidly ever since’ (The 
Wake of Imagination, 19), though there is some tension between this and his interrogation of 
the imminent demise of the imagination from which comes the title of his book.  
 5 See Matthew M. Maguire, The Conversion of the Imagination: From Pascal through 
Rousseau to Tocqueville (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. P., 2006), 15.  
 6 The end of the postmodern era is suggested by the emergence of retrospective 
exhibitions such as Postmodernism: Style and Subversion 1970–1990 on display at the Victoria 
and Albert Museum in London from 24 September 2011 to 15 January, 2012.  
 7 For Fredric Jameson four losses are symptomatic of postmodernism: suppression of 
subjective inwardness; referential depth, historical time and coherent human expression (see 
Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism: Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism [Durham, NC: 
Duke U. P., 1991). 
 8 See Timothy J. Reiss, Knowledge, Discovery and Imagination in Early Modern 
Europe: The Rise of Aesthetic Rationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1997), 16 for his 
working definition of the term ‘fictive imagination’.  
 9 Scholarship on the modern imagination is vast. Key examples of single-authored 
contributions include: Mary Warnock, Imagination (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1978); 
James Engell, The Creative Imagination: From Enlightenment to Romanticism (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard U. P., 1981); Eva Brann, The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991); J. M. Cocking, Imagination: A Study in the History 
of Ideas, ed., with an intro., by Penelope Murray (London/New York: Routledge, 1994); John 
Sallis, Force of the Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental (Bloomington: Indiana U. P., 
2000).   
seek to celebrate how the fictive imagination(s), as realized in diverse written 
and visual texts of Early Modern Iberia (a context often neglected in broad 
historical surveys) emerge from the matter of their specific moments of origin 
in epoch-marking, as well as epoch-(un)/making ways. So our approach is not 
ahistorical, nor do we treat imagination as a floating signifier, or engage with 
its plural manifestations as testimony to Derrida’s legacy of Babel.10 On the 
contrary, as we hope the reader will see, our shared conceptualization 
identifies in imagination’s inherent mobility a sensitivity to the following 
three key notions: primarily, the mutually constitutive interplay between the 
poetic imaginary (written, visual, performative) and contingent socio-
cultural/political matters; secondly, the potential inversion of inherited 
binaries in/through this process—for instance, reality, understood as the 
‘felt, “real world” ’, tested against Early Modern Iberia’s imaginative 
reconfigurations,11 or the imaginative when it makes sense only in relation 
to its non-subordination to realities (whose undoing from within is often a 
vital part of their coming into being); and finally, the creative role of the 
receiver, whose embodied integration as ‘other’ allows the articulations of 
selfhood (individual or collective), constructed by the imagination, to 
materialize fully as experiences in time.  Ultimately, in showcasing the poetic 
imagination in Early Modern Iberia, in alignment with this understanding, 
we aim to restore to the imagination, in equal measure, both its reason and 
its ‘rhyme’.  
Imagination in the Western tradition (phantasia in its Platonic genesis) 
has long had a complex relationship with the rational, and a problematic 
association with fiction as a space where potentially destructive desires can 
be mobilized.  Readers of Plato have much to answer for in this regard.  For 
the tendency has been to derive from an overtly polyvocal philosopher a 
binary view of the imagination that locates it, not just on the opposing bank 
of our stream of consciousness, but in decidedly more perilous cognitive 
terrain.12  So, for instance, Dan Flory determines that, when it comes to a 
mental capacity that trades only in sensible knowledge and unstable 
                                                          
 10 Jacques Derrida engages with the legacy of Babel in ‘Des Tours de Babel’, trans. 
Joseph F. Graham, in Difference in Translation, ed., with an intro., by Joseph F. Graham 
(Ithaca: Cornell U. P., 1985), 165–248 (p. 171).  According to his reading the destruction of the 
tower and a single language resulted in the impossible of reconstructing either, henceforth 
the plurality of languages and a confusing multiplicity of meanings.  
 11 Reiss, Knowledge, Discovery and Imagination, xvi. 
 12 Isabel Torres offers a brief consideration of the polyvocality of Plato’s writings for our 
understanding of the aesthetic dimensions of his practice that tend to generate unresolved 
contradictions. Just like the work of the poets he would ban from the Republic, Plato’s images 
often mobilize readers both rationally and affectively, thereby opening a space for the 
individualistic free-thinking he most distrusts (see Isabel Torres, ‘Moving in … Garcilaso’s 
“Dulces prendas por mi mal halladas” ’, in Spanish Golden Age Poetry in Motion: The 
Dynamics of Creation and Conversation, ed. Jean Andrews & Isabel Torres 
(Woodbridge/Rochester, NY: Tamesis, 2014), 41–58 (pp. 41–43). 
perceptions, Plato believes us to be better off without it.13  It is true that if 
we pay attention only to what Plato says, rather than to how he says it, there 
is no other conclusion to be reached. For notwithstanding a brief 
acknowledgement that imagination has a communicative power that is 
effective in opening up channels with the gods (Timaeus, 71–72), or a more 
positive attitude to erotic desire (the child of lack and invention) as a spur 
for creativity (a view that emerges in a drinking party definition of love) 
(Symposium, 205e),14 Plato postulates an ideal world of forms, a ‘true reality’, 
that can only be accessed properly by reason, and through the suppression of 
anything that holds us in the inferior, false realm of appearances. The great 
paradox in Plato, however, is that in order to persuade us of the truth as he 
would have it, he turns to the literary device of allegory—a practice which, 
according to his own theory, should push us further from his desired 
objective.15  In one of his most powerful poetic visions, the allegory of the 
cave, Plato depends entirely on the creative agency of the imaginative 
perceiver.  Socrates asks us to ‘imagine’ a group of prisoners, chained up in 
a cave and forced endlessly to watch a shadow theatre, performed by 
puppeteers, and to further ‘imagine’ what would happen if an escaped 
prisoner were to access the world outside, and return with a knowledge of 
the sun that those incarcerated are unable and unwilling to grasp.  Our 
participation in the Socratic allegory requires us to remake our own 
perception of reality, to create an alternative to our experience of it, to 
‘imagine’ along the fault lines of reason (Republic, 514a–522b).16   The 
allegorical identifications do emerge (the puppeteer-poet; the escaped 
prisoner-philosopher), but not entirely unscathed. The sort of theodicy 
invoked here has a problematic reciprocal transfer at its core, reason and/or 
imagination vindicated in response to the evidence of the problem of the 
other.  It is a short, albeit perhaps too radical, step from here to the notion of 
reason and the imagination in Platonic practice (if not theory) as cognitive 
correlates,17 but the creative interdependence demanded of Plato’s reader 
                                                          
 13 See Dan Flory, ‘Stoic Psychology, Classical Rhetoric, and Theories of Imagination in 
Western Philosophy’, Philosophy and Rhetoric, 29:2 (1996), 147–67 (p. 147). 
 14 Plato, Timaeus, trans. Benjamin Jowett, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, 
including the Letters, ed., with an intro. & prefatory notes, by Edith Hamilton & Huntington 
Cairns (Princeton: Princeton U. P., 1973), 1153–211; Plato, The Symposium, trans. Walter 
Hamilton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951).  
 15 According to the philosophy of mimesis most explicitly outlined in the Republic, the 
world around us is an inferior copy, a shadow world, of the ideal world of forms; literature, 
which imitates the appearance of our world, is therefore a bad copy of a bad copy, and so is 
twice removed from truth (see Plato, Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, rev. by C. D. C. Reeve, 
2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992).  
 16 The myth of Err, the culminating allegory of the soul, is arguable Plato’s most 
powerfully poetic passage (Plato, Republic, trans. Grube, 614b ff).  
 17 Interestingly recent advances in cognitive science suggest that rational thought is 
more imaginative than we have believed. This is the basis of Ruth M. J. Byrne’s ground-
certainly implies a much more inclusive, composite, appreciation than the 
Aristotelian model that would follow, for all that the latter would give rise to 
a more polemical reception.18 
The imagination figures centrally in a number of Aristotelian texts (e.g. 
accounts of dreaming and memory both make significant use of the notion),19 
but only in the De anima (III.3) do we find a systematic account. According 
to Michael Wedin this passage, which culminates in a ‘central thesis’, 
constitutes Aristotle’s official theory of the imagination and should be 
considered the ‘canonical text’:20 
But since when one thing has been set in motion another thing may be 
moved by it, and imagination is held to be a movement and to be 
impossible without sensation, i.e. to occur in beings that are percipient 
and to have for its content what can be perceived, and since movement 
may be produced by actual sensation and that movement is necessarily 
similar in character to the sensation itself, this movement must be 
necessarily incapable of existing apart from sensation (such that in virtue 
of its possession that in which it is found may present various phenomena 
both active and passive), and such that it may be either true or false […] 
then imagination must be a movement resulting from an actual exercise 
of a power of sense. As sight is the most highly developed sense, the name 
                                                          
breaking study, The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).  
 18 This is not to suggest that Plato’s ‘afterlives’ are not varied in content and objectives, 
for one need only compare Wordsworth and Nietzsche.  The former finds in Plato a power of 
poetic imagination that could be made ethical, the latter identifies in Plato a dawning of 
decadence that would last two millennia. As illustrative, see William Wordsworth, ‘Preface to 
Lyrical Ballads’, in Romanticism: An Anthology, ed., with an intro., by Duncan Wu, 4th ed. 
(Chichester/Malden: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), 506–17 (esp. p. 507), and Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans., with an intro. & 
commentary, by R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), 14.  But the general 
thrust of Plato’s thinking on the imagination, as expressed at the primary level of the 
narration, is rarely disputed, whereas scholars have long debated the import of the 
Aristotelian definition.  
 19 For instance, De insomniis, 460b28-29 and 462a8-9; Analytica posteriora, II.19 and 
Metaphysica 980b25-2: See On Dreams, trans. J. I. Beare, Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan 
Barnes, Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised 
Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols (Princeton: Princeton U. P., 1984), I, 729–35, 
I, 114–66 and II, 1552–728 respectively.  
 20 See Michael V. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven/London: Yale 
U. P., 1988), esp. Chapter 2, ‘The Canonical Theory of Imagination’, 23–63.  Wedin proposes 
a cognitivist /functionalist interpretation which is remarkable for two key notions: (1) that 
most commentators are mistaken in following Aquinas in taking the broader ‘canonical text’ 
to contain Aristotle’s central thesis (i.e. imagination is identified with a movement resulting 
from sense perception), which is not actually asserted until a little further on; (2) that 
although the imagination has cognitive capability, it is functionally incomplete, and therefore 
not in itself a ‘discriminative faculty’ (48), but rather subserves other faculties and occurs in 
the course of another faculty’s operation (45–51).  
Phantasia (imagination)21 has been formed from Phaos (light), because it 
is not possible to see without light.  And because imaginations remain in 
the organs of sense and resemble sensations, animals in their actions are 
largely guided by them, some (i.e. the brutes) because of the non-existence 
in them of mind, others (i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in 
them of mind by feeling or disease or sleep.  
 About imagination, what it is and why it exists, let so much suffice.22  
Aristotle has often been charged with inconsistency in his treatment of the 
imagination, due in large part to the ‘serpentine’ nature of the argument as 
articulated above; a passage that appears to be presented by the author as 
his definitive word on the subject.23  But we are not concerned here with 
reconstructing an Aristotelian theory of the imagination based on a single 
(short) text in Aristotle’s corpus (a dubious enterprise that Amélie Oksenberg 
Rorty has dismissed as the ‘read and raid’ approach);24 rather we wish to 
reflect briefly upon the process of mediation through time and space that has, 
like the fluid workings of imagination itself, transformed traces of  both 
Aristotle and Plato into distinct, critical interventions;25 moments in the 
                                                          
 21 Scholars continue to dispute whether the common translation of ‘phantasia’ as 
‘imagination’ actually makes sense in the light of Aristotle’s arguments. For a brief 
consideration of this issue, see Victor Caston, ‘Why Aristotle Needs Imagination’, Phronesis, 
41:1 (1996), 20–55 (pp. 20–22).  José María Pozuelo Yvancos notes that in Classical Latin 
literature ‘imaginatio’ is the accepted translation of the Greek ‘phantasia’, so is not surprising 
that Early Modern Spanish texts use ‘fantasía’ and ‘imaginación’ interchangeably, as there is 
an almost total coincidence of meaning (see José María Pozuelo Yvancos, La invención 
literaria: Garcilaso, Góngora, Cervantes, Quevedo y Gracián [Salamanca: Univ. de Salamanca, 
2014], 41). 
 22 De anima, 428b10–17; 428b30–429a1.  See On the Soul, trans. J. A. Smith, in The 
Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Barnes, I, 641–92. 
 23 Caston, ‘Why Aristotle Needs Imagination’, 20: ‘The chapter’s serpentine argument 
nowhere announces its motives in a straightforward way’.  For D. W. Hamlyn, the problem 
lies in Aristotle’s lack of clarity about the status of the imagination: ‘an unsatisfactory halfway 
status between perception and the intellect’ (see D. W. Hamlyn, ‘Introduction’, in Aristotle’s 
‘De anima’, Books II and III, trans., with intro. & notes, by D. W. Hamlyn [Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1968], ix–xvi [p. xiv]). However, Martha Nussbaum urges caution, referring to the 
‘unusually corrupt’ nature of the De anima text, especially Book 3 (see Martha C. Nussbaum, 
‘Introduction: A. The Text of Aristotle’s De anima’, in Essays on Aristotle’s ‘De anima’, ed. 
Martha C. Nussbaum & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992], 1–6 [p. 2]).  
 24 See Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, ‘Introduction: B. De anima: Its Agenda and Its Recent 
Interpreters’, in Essays on Aristotle’s ‘De anima’, ed. Nussbaum & Oksenberg Rorty, 7–14 (p. 
13).  
 25 Among prominent new historicists Louis Montrose was instrumental in urging the 
reader to see the text within a continuous process of mediation. His most quoted phrase 
recognizes ‘the historicity of texts and the textuality of history’ (see Louis Adrian Montrose, 
‘Renaissance Literary Studies and the Subject of History’, English Literary Renaissance, 16:1 
[1986], 5–12 [p. 8]).  Of course, as Virginia Mason Vaughan has pointed out, what was 
‘strikingly “new” practice in the 1980s’ had already become ‘common practice’ by the beginning 
of the twenty-first century (see Virginia Mason Vaughan, ‘Stephen Greenblatt and the New 
migration of the imagination that accommodate past conceptualizations 
alongside fresh resonance, while also playing host to future acts of response.  
Whatever starting point the reader chooses, whatever reading route one 
follows, the points on the imaginative circuit tend to loop back round to the 
twin pillars of the Classical tradition (though of course not exclusively), and 
often within six degrees of separation. For instance, the Aristotelian notion 
of the imagination as movement haunts Walter Pater’s late Victorian 
engagement with Hellenism, notably on both sides of a dialectic that sets 
Romanticism against Classicism: the centrifugal tendency of the former 
‘flying from the centre, throwing itself forth in endless play of undirected 
imagination’, […] in changeful form everywhere’, set against the centripetal 
impulse of the latter, pulling inwards towards a conservative centre.26 The 
fluidity of this centrifugal imagination has a transformative quality, a power 
of transfiguration that Pater associated with genius,27 and from which his 
predecessor Samuel Coleridge had deduced the poetic ideal of 
defamiliarization.  Although more familiar to us, perhaps, as a cornerstone 
of Russian formalism (from Viktor Shklovsky’s declaration that the 
‘technique of art is to make objects unfamiliar’),28 it is in Coleridge’s earlier 
version that the imagination’s capacity for shedding the skin of the familiar 
depends more obviously on its association with the heightened sensations of 
‘beings that are percipient’.29 Coleridge’s theory of defamiliarization echoes 
radically in Shelley’s ‘A Defence of Poetry’, a treatise that advocates a 
sometimes contradictory counter-play of imagination and thought.30 Most 
notably, however, Shelley celebrates imagination’s power of association and, 
more specifically, our capacity, as perceivers, to recognize ‘the 
unapprehended relation of things’ and to renew our experience in, and of, a 
world that has been ‘blunted by reiteration’.31  Thus the imaginative acts of 
renewal intuited by Shelley extend beyond the aesthetic (and beyond 
Coleridge’s focus on individual selfhood) to embrace the possibility of social 
reform. Both Coleridge and Shelley seem wary, however, of the freedom that 
                                                          
Historicism’, in Modern North American Criticism and Theory: A Critical Guide, ed. Julian 
Wolfrys [Edinburgh: Edinburgh U. P., 2006], 103–09 [p. 109]).  
 26 The quotation is taken from Walter Pater, ‘The Marbles of Ӕgina’, in Greek Studies: 
A Series of Essays by Walter Pater, prepared for the press by Charles L. Shadwell (London: 
MacMillan & Co., 1901), 266–85 (p. 267; emphasis added). The essay first appeared in 
Fortnightly Review in April, 1880.  
 27 See, for instance, Walter Pater, Plato and Platonism: A Series of Lectures (London: 
MacMillan & Co., 1909), 274–76. 
 28 See Viktor Shklovsky, ‘Art As Technique’, in Literary Theory: An Anthology, ed. Julie 
Rivkin & Michael Ryan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 17–23 (p. 18). 
 29 See Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia literaria; or, Biographical Sketches of My 
Literary Life and Opinions, ed., with an intro., by George G. Watson (London: Dent, 1975). 
For reference to defamiliarization as a form of intensified, original, perception, see p. 49. 
 30 See Percy Bysshe Shelley, ‘A Defence of Poetry’, in The Major Works, ed., with an 
intro. & notes, by Zachary Leader & Michael O’Neill (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 2003), 674–701.  
 31 Shelley, ‘A Defence of Poetry’, 676, 698. 
lies within imagination’s grasp, the power to conjure up images that are not 
an accurate reflection of the ‘Truth’ (or, in Aristotle’s words, ‘that may be 
false’). Both invoke, therefore, an idealistic Neoplatonism wherein poetry is 
rescued from the realm of illusions as a vehicle for the infinite.32  
The imagination that emerges from the interconnectedness of Pater, 
Coleridge, Shklovsky and Shelley is a subject in constant reinvention, an 
entity that can be immersed in precise socio-cultural relations of knowledge 
and power, while also constituting a broader conversation that runs deep into 
Plato and Aristotle, and so transcends historical particulars. It is important 
to bear this in mind when broaching the question of the ‘imagination’ as 
realized in Early Modern Iberia; and to approach monolithic 
conceptualizations about the Renaissance with some caution. For just as the 
inventive vernacular fictions of Boccaccio and Petrarch are liable to evoke 
the affective responses that Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola would ban 
from the watchtower of reason,33 so the creative imagination at work in the 
sensually evocative love poetry of Garcilaso de la Vega seems a worldview 
removed from the moralistic musings of Juan Luis Vives.34 Where the latter’s 
interest in the operations of the soul betrays a fundamental distrust of the 
erotic powers of human phantasy, Garcilaso puts the corporeal at the centre 
of a complex meshing of memory, imagination, mind and matter.35  Even in 
the pitched battle of Canción IV, the conflicting spheres of reason and the 
imagination seem to be invaded by the opposing force, so that ultimately the 
poem’s ‘making believe’ depends on a certain synthesis or ‘trade-off’, rather 
than a truce.36 Indeed, throughout Garcilaso’s poetic universe, thought 
                                                          
 32 See, for instance, Coleridge, Biographia literaria, ed. Watson, I. 263, where he states 
that his ‘system’ is that of ‘Pythagoras and of Plato revived and purified from impure 
mixtures’; and Shelley, ‘A Defence of Poetry’, 677: ‘A poet participates in the eternal, the 
infinite, and the one’.   
 33 See Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, Liber De Imaginatione/On the Imagination, 
Latin text with an intro., an English trans. & notes by Harry Caplan (New Haven: Yale U. P., 
1930); the soul transcends the flesh, high above the whirl of phantasms, in the ‘lofty watch-
tower of the intellect’ (85).  
 34 See Juan Luis Vives, De anima et vita, in Opera omnia, ed. Gregorio Mayans y Siscar, 
8 vols (Valencia: Montford, 1782–90; repr. London: Gregg Press, 1964), III, 300–514.  Written 
in 1538, the De anima et vita is one of Vives’ works that was not translated into vernacular 
languages.  
 35 See Mary E.  Barnard’s chapter, ‘Eros at Material Sites’, which includes insightful 
analysis of a key metaphor in Garcilaso’s Sonnet V (the woman as a garment covering the 
subject’s soul) as an eroticized reimagining of a passage from Hugh of St Victor: Mary E. 
Barnard, Garcilaso de la Vega and the Material Culture of Renaissance Europe (Toronto: Univ. 
of Toronto Press, 2014), 125–51 (pp. 150–51). 
 36 The fluctuating fortunes of imagination/appetite and reason, and the impact on the 
poetic subject are captured in the stanza that opens: ‘No reina siempre aquesta fantasía, / que 
en imaginación tan variable / no se reposa un hora el pensamiento: viene con un rigor tan 
intratable / a tiempos el dolor que al alma mía / desampara, huyendo, el sufrimiento. / Lo que 
dura la furia del tormento, / no hay parte en mí que no se me trastorne / y que en torno de mí 
no esté llorando, / de nuevo protestando / que de la via espantosa atrás me torne’ (Garcilaso 
emerges emotionalized, while emotion (materialized in words) is made to 
catch at fact (including the definitive cadences of death) across a welter of 
immaterialities. The poet’s most famous editor, Fernando de Herrera, 
commenting on Sonnet III, intuits this fluid cross-fertilization, but attempts 
to corral the strands into identifiable sources, and although not entirely 
successful, nor accurate, the effort is testimony to the idiosyncratic priorities 
of the individual reader (in this case the editor/poet’s rhetorical leanings), as 
well as to the transcultural currents that flowed into the collective 
imaginary: 
Es la fantasía potencia natural de l’anima sensitiva, i es aquel 
movimiento o ación de las imágenes aparentes i de las especias 
impressas. Tomó nombre griego de la lumbre, como dize Aristóteles, 
porque el viso, que es el más aventajado i nobilísimo sentido, no se puede 
ejercer sin lumbre […] Tulio la interpretó viso; Quintiliano visio, i los 
modernos imaginación. Pinciano Lido, en el libro sobre Teofrasto Del 
sentido i fantasia, dize en el Libro I, que son tres las facultades interiores 
de l’anima, que Galeno llama regidoras, dexando el entendimiento, que el 
médico lo considera poco: la memoria, la razón i la fuerça de imaginar, 
que es la fantasía, común a todos los animados, pero mucho mayor i más 
distinta en el ombre […] i por esta se representan de tal suerte en el 
ánimo las imágenes de las cosas ausentes que nos parece que las vemos 
con los ojos i las tenemos presentes, i podemos fingir i formar en el ánimo 
verdaderas i falsas imágenes a nuestra voluntad i arbitrio, i estas 
imágenes vienen a la fantasía de los sentidos exteriores.37 
Herrera’s entry also testifies to the significance of a third Classical theory of 
the imagination that is often overlooked, despite the fact that it offers an 
epistemology that appears to be much closer to the ‘modern’ philosophical 
notion of imagination as a primary source of artistic creativity and 
knowledge: the Stoic treatment of phantasai that was transmitted through 
the writings of Greek and Latin rhetoricians, such as Longinus, Philostratus, 
Cicero and Quintilian.38 Developing upon Gerard Watson’s research, Flory 
makes a compelling case for the transmission of the resolutely materialistic 
theory expounded by the Stoics wherein all human beings possess a psychic 
domain whose contents may be approved by reason but are provided by the 
imagination.39 Within this internal realm (or ‘parallel universe’) we perform 
                                                          
de la Vega, Obra poética y textos en prosa, ed., prólogo & notas de Bienvenido Morros, con un 
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Further references to Garcilaso will be taken from this edition.  
 37 Fernando de Herrera, Obras de Garcilaso de la Vega con anotaciones (Sevilla: Alonso 
de la Barrera, 1580), 299–300.  
 38 See Flory, ‘Stoic Psychology’. Relevant passages from the rhetoricians are included 
throughout the article. 
 39 Flory, ‘Stoic Psychology’, esp. pp. 151–55.  See also Gerard Watson, Phantasai in 
Classical Thought (Galway: Univ. of Galway Press, 1988). 
a range of mental operations, including incorporeal world-building (the 
construction of new mental entities), the visualisation of objects not 
previously seen, and the capacity to convey these end products of phantasai 
in speech. The writings of Quintilian demonstrate how philosophical rhetoric 
played a key role in transferring these theories of its sister discipline: 
There are certain experiences which the Greeks call phantasai, and the 
Romans visiones, whereby things absent are presented to our 
imaginations with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be 
before our very eyes […] Some writers describe the possessor of this power 
of vivid imagination whereby things, words, and actions are presented in 
the most realistic manner by the Greek word euphantasiotos [‘people 
blessed with imagination’], and it is a power which all may readily 
acquire if they will.40 
Flory is most insistent on a strong affinity between the creative and cognitive 
functions of the stoical/rhetorical theories of imagination, and post-
Enlightenment conceptions in modern theories of knowledge.41 However, 
Herrera’s intervention as theorist (echoing Quintilian) on the one hand, and 
Garcilaso’s poetic practice on the other, would suggest that the Christian 
hold on epistemology which seriously restricted the mental capacity of the 
imagination may have been tested and loosened, if not entirely broken, in 
many individual, pre-Enlightenment, instantiations. Despite the legacy of 
Augustine, for whom the imagination, although treated on occasions with 
qualified appreciation, was always a conduit (with an error-prone dimension 
conducive to sinfulness), and less an independently creative power;42 the 
humanist celebration of literature as man’s creation, often followed 
rhetorical signposts and directed the imagination into the service of the 
creative arts.  
Amidst these rhetorical explorations of the mechanisms of the 
imagination, its materializing dimension is often either implicit or openly 
acknowledged. Mary Barnard’s recent explanation of the concept of Enargeia 
presents it as a rhetoric of presence, using word-pictures to evoke mental 
images, its affective power residing in its ability to make the audience or 
reader ‘see’ what is being described.  Barnard notes that in De copia Erasmus 
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later post-Enlightenment thinkers also found inspiration in Neoplatonic writings. But his 
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 42 The bibliography on Augustine’s understanding of the imagination is immense, and 
bound up with his view of memory. For a very useful synthesis, see Marianne’s Djuth’s article 
‘Veiled and Unveiled Beauty: The Role of the Imagination in Augustine’s Esthetics’, 
Theological Studies, 68 (2007), 77–91.  Djuth notes that Augustine ‘places imagination at the 
crossroads of salvation’ (77). 
suggested that instead of setting out the subject in bare simplicity, the 
colours are filled in and set up like a picture to look at, so that we seem to 
have painted the scene rather than described it, and the reader seems to have 
seen rather than read.43  Terence Cave finds a fusion of res and verba in this 
Erasmian understanding of linguistic plentitude:   ‘For Erasmus true 
linguistic plenitude occurs when words are properly and richly “filled with” 
things calling forth a visible presence to the eyes of the mind, and achieving 
a fusion of res and verba’.44 Barnard illustrates the concept by presenting 
Nemoroso in  Garcilaso’s second  Eclogue as the orator who, in the practice 
of enargeia, ‘breaks through the silence’.45 Certainly Nemoroso’s ecphrastic 
description underscores that accomplished artifice renders the verbal and 
the visual indistinguishable:  
 Él está ejercitando el duro oficio,  
 y con tal arteficio la pintura  
 mostraba su figura, que dijeras, 
  si pintado lo vieras, que hablaba.   
(Garcilaso, Eclogue II, ll. 1228–31) 
The ‘eyes of the mind’ are similiarly prioritized within the  realms of the 
sacred textual tradition; the dissemination of St Ignatius’ Ejercicios 
espirituales (1548) contributes to the emergence of a form of private devotion 
which encourages the imagination to move beyond the textual representation 
of the transcendent, to foster an immersive and emotive identification with 
the passion. Elena Carrera has reminded us that St Teresa’s contemplative 
devotion extended to  encouraging the sisters to marshall their imaginative 
power to consider the details of suffering which the evangelists failed to 
capture: ‘licencia nos da el Señor—a lo que pienso—, como nos la da, para 
que pensando en la sagrada Pasión, pensemos muchas más cosas de fatigas 
y tormentos que allí devía de padecer el Señor de que los evangelistas 
escriven’.46 Teresa gestures towards the limitations of textual renderings of 
the spiritual and physical suffering of an incarnate God.  Nevertheless the 
caution surrounding the potential of the imagination, heightened for a 
woman claiming direct contact with the deity, remains.  In fact Teresa evokes 
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in Collected Works of Erasmus, ed. Craig R. Thompson, trans. Betty I. Knott (Toronto: Univ. 
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 44 Terence Cave, ‘Enargeia: Erasmus and the Rhetoric of Presence in the Sixteenth 
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 45 Barnard, Garcilaso de la Vega, 120. 
 46 Meditations 1.8, in Obras completas de Santa Teresa de Jesús, transcripción,, intro. 
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Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Culture, ed. Lisa Perfetti (Gainesville: Univ. Press 
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the limitations of the human imagination to underscore the veracity of the 
gradual revelation she documents in the Libro de la vida: ‘Pues ser 
imaginación esto, es imposible de toda imposibilidad; ningún camino lleva, 
porque sola la hermosura y blancura de una mano es sobre toda nuestra 
imaginación’.47  
To the Early Modern mind then, as the essays in this volume will show, 
the imagination was a formidable force. It was there that possibility, 
transcendence and freedom dwelled, for good or bad. For if the ‘fuerça de 
imaginar’ could stimulate and illuminate, creating new worlds that allowed 
for the interrogation of ‘potentially damaging truths in imaginary spaces’, it 
also created imagined histories and built ‘new worlds’ that could, and would, 
cast a darker colonial shadow.48  Within and beyond Early Modern Iberia the 
rhetorical concretizing of mental images continually collides with the 
physical materialization of imaginary spaces. Amidst the epistemological 
challenge presented by the Americas, we know that commentators sought to 
find precursors of their new reality in the imagined worlds of old.49  Indeed, 
the inclination to ‘read’ the new territories as other-wordly would prove 
persistent, continuing into the seventeenth century. Antonio León Pinelo’s 
El paraíso en el Nuevo Mundo (1656) argued for the Peruvian Amazon as the 
location of earthly paradise. This text is cited by Mario Vargas Llosa as an 
example of: 
[…] la tenaz predilección de los cronistas y historiadores de Indias por ver 
en el dominio descubierto por Colón una tierra de maravillas, en la que 
se materializaban los reinos y ciudades de la mitología grecorromana y 
medieval y los personajes más extravagantes.50    
In fact, the imaginative modes and depictions of mythical spaces which 
flourished in the Renaissance would find their way off the page in myriad 
ways.  Within the realms of festival and pageantry, the transformative power 
of the imagination was engaged in effectively ‘setting forth’ the material 
environment of Spain and Spanish America in rich tapestry.51  In a recent 
                                                          
 47 Santa Teresa de Jesús, Libro de la vida, ed., con intro., de Dámaso Chicharro (Madrid: 
Cátedra, 2014), 356. 
 48 See Allison B. Kavey, ‘Introduction’, in World-Building and the Early Modern 
Imagination, ed. Allison B. Kavey (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 1–4 (p. 3). 
 49 As David Abulafia notes: ‘Classical imagery remained at the forefront of early 
descriptions of the new world by writers at the royal court in Spain.  It fused with imagery of 
the Garden of Eden, a favourite theme of the Bible-reading Columbus’ (see David Abulafia, 
The Discovery of Mankind: Atlantic Encounters in the Age of Columbus [New Haven/London: 
Yale U. P., 2008], 18). 
 50 Mario Vargas Llosa, Sueño y realidad de América Latina (Barcelona: Arcadia, 2010), 
9; emphasis added. 
 51 The full reference is to Sidney: ‘Nature never set forth the earth in such rich tapestry 
as divers poets have done; neither with pleasant rivers, fruitful trees, sweet-smelling flowers, 
not whatsoever else may make the too-much-loved earth more lovely; her world is brazen, the 
plenary lecture, Maria Cristina Quintero, a contributor to this volume, 
referred to the celebration of the wedding of Philip III to Margarita of Austria 
in the Plaza del Pilar in Zaragoza.52  The plaza was transformed into a 
marvellous forest for the occasion, and the distinguished participants 
wandered amidst animals both domestic and ‘exotic’, encountering figures 
dressed as nymphs and shepherds:  
[...] llegados sus Magestades con todo el sobredicho acompañamiento a la 
gran plassa de nuestra señora del Pilar, entraron passeándose por huna 
artificiossa traza, nunca vista, que tomava toda la dicha plassa, de un 
grande bosque muy arbolado de diversos árboles y plantas de mucha 
verdura. Y entrando en este bosque sus Magestades con todas las demás 
damas y cavalleros s’estuvieron passeando a cavallo por él, mirando las 
cossas tan señaladas y curiossas que havía dentro deste deleitosso 
bosque, tan bien puestas y adornadas, y, enserrados dentro del sin 
poderse salir, los animales que havía bivos dentro del bosque, que hultra 
de mucha diversidad de animales silvestres, ansí cuadrúpedos como 
volátiles, de ciervos, corzos, cabras muntessas, bueyes, vacas y terneras, 
carneros y ovexas con sus corderos, y por otra parte mucha manera de 
cassa de liebres y conexos, perdizes y francolines, gallinas domésticas y 
otras gallinas de las Indias y pavos reales con otras espescias y 
dife[re]ntes animallas. Y sin esto havía por sus cabos puestos en buen 
orden unas figuras y personados de bulto, los hunos adressados y vestidos 
como a pastores y otros como nimphas hermossas, puestos, adresados y 
hechos a coros, como suelen fingir adornar los pohetas sus cantos y 
discursos.53     
Subsequently we find abundant examples of attempts to capture such 
ephemeral spectacles in print, lush textual renderings of memorable displays 
of imperial might or of affective religious devotion occupying the pages of the 
festival books now gathering dust.54    
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 52 See her [unpublished] lecture entitled ‘Border Crossings, Theatre, and the 
Performance of Queenship in Habsburg Spain’, delivered in Northumbria University at the 
annual conference of the Association of Hispanists of Great Britain and Ireland, 5 April 2016.   
 53 The full account is reproduced in Teresa Ferrer Vals, Nobleza y espectáculo teatral 
(1535–1622) (Sevilla/Valencia: UNED, 1993), 220–23. Conversely in Potosí, an urban religious 
celebration is exuberantly re-imagined as a dramatic eclogue by Diego de Mexía in his ‘Égloga 
intitulada el dios Pan’, from the largely unpublished Segunda parte del Parnaso antártico de 
divinos poemas (Potosí, 1617); see Anne Holloway, ‘ “Otros montes, otros ríos”: The 
Apprehension of Alterity in a Spanish American Pastoral’, in her The Potency of Pastoral in 
the Hispanic Baroque (Woodbridge: Tamesis, forthcoming).  
 54 See, for example, Fernando de la Torre Farfán, Fiestas de la S. Iglesia Metropolitana 
y Patriarcal de Sevilla.  Al nuevo culto del señor Rey S. Fernando el tercero de Castilla y León 
(Sevilla, 1671). 
 Sidney also distinguishes between the unblemished world created by 
poets and the ‘Too-much-loved earth’, we occupy, a reminder that often the 
cherishing of the material is traceable as erosion—one need only consider the 
many objects of spiritual devotion in the Hispanic world, and beyond, which 
bear the traces of the passage of believers and their contact with the 
valorized artefacts.  In this act of communing with the sacred, the very 
process which layers the material with significance wears it away in 
successive interactions.  Conversely, cultural esteem and its associated 
material value can serve to enshrine the products of the artistic imagination, 
thereby imposing distance from the viewer, and rendering them somehow 
unassailable, frozen within particular interpretations.   The relatively recent 
‘turn towards materiality’ has seen the material object begin to feature 
amidst other types of evidence for humanities researchers.     While the 
Renaissance period has been centrally positioned within these new 
approaches, they have also been recently marked by a focus on the everyday 
object. 55        
As noted above, the imagination itself often slips between retrospectively 
imposed categories, with ‘epoch-(un)/making’ potential.  A focus on material 
culture can similarly trouble simplistic views, since as Tara Hamling and 
Catherine Richardson note, the potential of the approach may lie in its ability 
to add ‘texture and nuance’, and the possibility that ‘the grand narratives of 
history can be read against the detail of lived experience’.56   In uniting the 
symbolic and the material, Anne J. Cruz’s Material and Symbolic Circulation 
(2008) is an important study within Hispanism in this regard. Cruz’s own 
contribution to the Vulnerata (an image of the virgin mutilated by English 
soldiers) underpins a consideration of how political adversaries are imagined, 
how religious artefacts which bear traces of contact with an imagined ‘other’ 
can create real support for symbolic warfare.  Writing on the circulation of 
the body parts of martyrs Cruz reminds us that: ‘The recuperation of the 
Catholic martyrs’ body parts as sacred relics to be circulated among the 
                                                          
 55 Tara Hamling and Catherine Richardson point to a renewed interest in material 
culture from the 1990s onwards, beginning in Art History.  They suggest that the level of 
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 56 Hamling & Richardson, ‘Introduction’, in Everyday Objects, ed. Hamling & 
Richardson, 14; emphasis added.   
faithful demonstrates how the body politic could be united through the 
metonymical force imbued in each separate part’.57    
The collaborative essays gathered in this volume survey a range of 
striking examples of textual and visual artefacts, tangible evidence of the 
artistic imagination, channelled and distilled to produce the compelling 
material legacy of Early Modern Iberia. The explorations are anchored in 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Iberia, in the period known as the 
Golden Age.  While some contributors have opted for fully integrated, co-
authored essays, others have offered complementary or dialogical readings; 
all are innovative reflective responses to the overarching theme of ‘Imaginary 
Matters’. We are delighted to number amongst the issue’s contributors 
scholars who rank among the most distinguished in their respective fields, 
many of whom have collaborated with emerging early career researchers.  
Within the first grouping of essays (‘Material Imagination’) we include 
innovative reflections upon the Gongorist, Borgesian and Cervantine 
imaginations. It is now well established that long before Shelley, Luis de 
Góngora had already invited his reader to discern ‘the unapprehended 
relation of things’. In ‘Metaphor and Matter(s) Arising: Gongorine Metaphor 
and the Cultivation of the Imagination’ (000–000), Marsha Collins and Isabel 
Torres suggest, through a reading of the Fábula de Polifemo y Galatea and 
the Soledades,  as well as poems by Jorge Guillén and Vicente Aleixandre, 
that Góngora’s innovative deployment of metaphor produces ‘an imagined 
materiality that points to affect; an affective sensibility that has traditionally 
been denied to Góngora by literary critics and poetic disciples alike’ (000).  
From Góngora’s enigmatic cyclops to Borges’ ‘monstrous’ enumerations 
(Foucault), Lindsay Kerr and Bill Richardson’s ‘Locating Knowledge in 
Góngora and Borges’ (000–000) offers a critical reading of the Borgesian re-
imagining of the figure of Góngora; the hubris which Borges attributes to 
‘Daneri’ underpins a collaborative reading which is founded on an 
appreciation of the ‘self-awareness and playfulness that is always present in 
Góngora’s work’ (000). Ignacio Navarrete and Mary B. Quinn’s ‘Imagining 
Domesticity in Cervantes’ Novelas ejemplares and Don Quijote’ (000–000) 
considers the mundane domestic space as one no less ‘imagined’, albeit 
collectively; the ability of its imagined confines to uphold value systems and 
circumscribe individual freedoms is shown to be easily troubled in Cervantes’ 
shorter fiction as well as in his masterpiece.   
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In the subsequent grouping (‘Imagining Imperialism’) we find the 
immensity of epic and the subjectivity of lyric given equal weighting to 
interrogate nuanced poetic reflections upon the anxieties of empire.  Anne J. 
Cruz and María Cristina Quintero’s readings explore the juncture of empire 
and poetic selfhood, their contribution ‘Garcilaso/Góngora: Imagining the 
Self, Imagining Empire’ (000–000) unites the dominant poetic actors of the 
Spanish Renaissance and the Baroque.  Redressing a critical tendency to 
prioritize only classical and Italian poetics, Cruz detects neglected presences 
and tensions (Ausiàs March, the unorthodox theology of Juan de Valdés) 
amidst Garcilaso’s lyric.  The generic hybridity of the sonnets of Luis de 
Góngora reveals, Quintero suggests, ‘an at times jaundiced perspective on 
the mechanisms of power within a unique literary subjectivity’ (000).  
Catarina Fouto and Julian Weiss’ ‘Reimagining Imperialism in Faria e 
Sousa’s Lusíadas comentadas’ (000–000) re-examines the significance of this 
work of critical exegesis (Madrid, 1639) on the epic poem by Luis de Camões 
(Lisbon, 1572). They contend that while the text certainly reveals promotion 
of Early Modern imperialism, it also points to a simultaneous ‘anxiety over 
the shapelessness of empire, whose protean monstrosity threatens to 
overwhelm the creative imagination and swallow up the irreducible 
uniqueness of those who are its subjects and its agents’ (000). 
The third grouping, ‘Cultural Material in the Visual Imaginary’, unites 
explorations of Spain’s rich visual legacy, with a particular focus on sacred 
subject matter. In ‘Image and word in El Greco: The Stockholm Painting of 
St Peter and St Paul’ (000–000), Terence O’Reilly considers the full 
implications of the painting’s potential to ‘touch the conscience’ (000), based 
on an understanding of Christ as cornerstone or uniting wall, which is 
central to its poignant appeal for unity within a context of strife and division.  
In the companion essay to O’Reilly’s, ‘Pied Beauty: The Baroque Microcosms 
of Daniel Seghers’, Jeremy Robbins presents Seghers’ intricate canvases as 
‘true exemplars of the cultural  preoccupations, and the visual and 
intellectual tropes of Early Modern Europe’ (000), their feigned materiality 
connecting with their eschatological undercurrent.   In Laura Bass and Jean 
Andrews’ ‘ “Me juzgo por natural de Madrid”: Vincencio Carducho, Theorist 
and Painter of Spain’s Court Capital’ (000–000), Vicencio Carducho is 
positioned as firmly rooted within the artistic sensibility of his adopted 
Madrid. Bass proposes that the re-imagining of the court capital is central to 
the efforts of artists to re-define their own oficio in order to dignify their 
status.  Andrews considers the affective piety which informs Carducho’s 
visual depiction of interactions between believers and material 
representations of the sacred.  Depictions of saints in adoration of the crucifix 
produce compelling readings of faith’s power to ‘move’ the material object as 
well as the viewer.  In ‘The Fabric of Saintly Proof: Leocadia of Toledo from 
Orrente to Calderón’ (000–000), Arantza Mayo and Peter Cherry offer a 
detailed exploration of the ways in which authors and artists chronicle and 
recreate the material signs of sanctity.   Mayo appraises the tellings and 
retellings of this fourth-century patron of Toledo’s resurrection by Early 
Modern Spanish authors as celebrated as Lope de Vega and Pedro Calderón 
de la Barca, while Cherry focuses on the rich representation in the visual 
arts of Leocadia’s textual and material legacy.  Both readings present the 
recurrent apparitions of the saint, both spectral and material as playing a 
crucial role in cementing the alliance of Church and Monarchy.  
The collaborative essays in ‘Material and Symbolic Circulation’ share a 
focus on the women writers of Early Modern Iberia.  Here we are reminded 
that Elizabeth Lehfeldt nuanced our understanding of conventual space by 
deeming it a ‘permeable cloister’.58  In ‘Beyond the Boundaries of Private 
Spaces: Women and the Spanish Court’ (000–000), Trevor J. Dadson and 
Laura S. Muñoz Pérez propose a need for a wider acknowledgement of the 
writerly participation of Early Modern women within public spaces as well 
as confined ones.  Muñoz Pérez offers a striking example in Ana de Castro 
Egas, author of Eternidad del rey Felipe III (1629); a woman whose writings 
reveal the extent to which she was embedded in the court of Philip IV, and 
in literary as well as political intrigues.  A comment on the materiality and 
indeed purity of her language comes from none other than Francisco de 
Quevedo: ‘Las palabras sin bastardía mendiga de otras lenguas, que en 
algunos cuadernos por blasonar noticia desaliñan la nota, y cuando mas 
presumen de joyas, mejor se confiesan manchas’ (000).  In ‘ “O daughter … 
forget your people and your father’s house”: Early Modern Women Writers 
and the Spanish Imaginary’ (000–000), Anne Holloway and Ramona Wray 
bring together two accounts by women writers for whom contact with 
Spanish culture proves a creative spur for the imagination in both secular 
and sacred mode, Lady Ann Fanshawe and Mary Bonaventure Browne 
respectively. Fanshawe’s Memoirs are considered alongside the material 
legacy of her ‘Booke of Receipts of Physickes, Salues, Waters, Cordialls, 
Preserues and Cookery’, both texts repeatedly demonstrating her cultural 
sensitivity to the Spanish context. Mary Bonaventure Browne’s account 
demonstrates that what Richard Kearney recently termed ‘the enigma of 
signifying flesh’59 is intrinsic to female piety in the Iberian context, with the 
saintly body the site of confident interpretations of a religious community 
fractured and dispersed, yet still concerned with collective articulations of 
selfhood. 
Within the final grouping ‘Matters of Representation’ Melanie Henry and 
Jonathan Thacker are enabled, via a focus on the imagination, to move 
beyond old antagonisms in their discussion of the mature dramatic output 
work of Lope and Cervantes. Their essay ‘Self Construction and the 
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Imagination in the Drama of Lope de Vega and Cervantes’ (000-000) brings 
together the oft-commentated El castigo sin venganza and La entrenida 
(relatively over-looked within the Cervantine corpus), and prioritizes the use 
of imagined spaces within the imagined space of the stage.  El castigo’s 
poeticized locus amoenus and La entretenida’s entremés permit the 
precarious realization of transgressive desires.  In the final dialogical 
contribution ‘Imitation and Adaptation: A Meeting of Minds’ (000–000), 
Emilie L. Bergmann frames the creative conversation her essay establishes 
with Edward Friedman in Early Modern terms, reminding us of the 
imaginative potential of the Renaissance understanding of poetic imitation. 
Taking us forward in time, and exploring the varied possibilities for the 
realisation of the poetic imagination, Bergmann’s discussion, ‘Literary 
Creation As Collaboration: Working Together across Centuries’, 
encompasses  Giannina Braschi’s El imperio de los sueños, underscoring the  
continuing vigour of the Renaissance pastoral metaphor within the urban 
North American context, an essay which serves to remind us of the continued 
need for the creation of imagined and potentially transformative spaces. 
Friedman’s overview of his own abundant contributions to the realization of 
the Early Modern imagination on the twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
stage in ‘Imitations of Life, Imitations of Art: Lost in Transition’ memorably 
presents us with a Quixote who defiantly confronts a malevolent ‘spectre of 
my own imagination!’ (000) In our own often troubling and uncertain present, 
perhaps this Quixotic moment of clarity is an instructive one, recalling 
Rebecca Solnit’s rallying call to an activism founded in hope.  Solnit points 
out that all transformations must begin in the imagination, a timely 
reminder that the ‘necessary angel’ always requires us to ‘start over, with an 
imagination adequate to the possibilities and the strangeness and the 
dangers on the earth at this moment’.60 
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